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Elinor Ostrom’s Legacy: Governing the Commons, and the Rational  
Choice Controversy 
Tim Forsyth and Craig Johnson 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Elinor Ostrom had a profound impact on development studies through her work on 
public choice, institutionalism and the commons. In 2009, she became the first — and 
so far, only — woman to win a Nobel Prize for Economics (a prize shared with Oliver 
Williamson). Moreover, she won this award as a political scientist, which caused 
controversy among some economists. She committed her professional life to 
expanding traditional economic thinking beyond questions of individualistic rational 
behaviour towards a greater understanding of self-regulating cooperative action 
within public policy. In particular, she organized the University of Indiana’s 
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis with her husband, Vincent Ostrom, 
and the International Association for the Study of the Commons (IASC). She also 
earned the reputation of a loyal and caring colleague and mentor. She donated much 
money to the University of Indiana, including her Nobel Prize money. 
 
The purpose of this article is to identify and discuss Elinor Ostrom’s legacy in 
international development. Rather than being a simple obituary, this article also seeks 
to review the tensions arising from her work, especially concerning the debate about 
institutions and the commons, and particularly Ostrom’s own focus on rational choice 
theory and methodological individualism as a means of understanding cooperative 
behavior.  
_____________________________ 
First unnumbered footnote 
The authors thank three anonymous referees for comments, and Arun Agrawal, Simon 
Dietz, and Matthew Paterson for valuable suggestions. Any errors remain the 
responsibility of the authors. 
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Ostrom’s work here has defined a field of research, and radically changed 
understandings. It also inspired work on the governance of public economics (Ostrom 
et al., 1993), and later writings on the institutions of development aid (Gibson et al., 
2005). By so doing, we argue that Ostrom’s main legacy within development studies 
has been her development and communication of rational choice approaches to 
institutional thinking. In turn, this work has influenced policy debates about natural-
resource management, and recent approaches to multi-level governance and 
polycentrism within environment and development. Yet, this approach has also 
produced tensions within development studies, which remain largely unresolved 
(Bardhan and Ray, 2008a). We argue that Ostrom’s work reflected wider transitions 
in social science and international development over a period of decades, but also 
indicates some of the key dilemmas faced by development studies in integrating 
political science and economics as useful and respected forms of analysis. 
 
 
Early Career 
 
Elinor Ostrom was born Elinor Claire Awan in Los Angeles, California in 1933, the 
daughter of an unemployed Hollywood set designer father, and a musician mother. 
She studied at University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), where she married a 
classmate. This first marriage, however, did not prosper. ‘I was thinking of doing a 
Ph.D.’ Elinor later explained, ‘and he was not too enthusiastic’ (Woo, 2012). They 
divorced, and she returned to UCLA to do this PhD. In 1963, she married Vincent 
Ostrom, one of her professors. In 1965, she took up a job at the University of Indiana, 
where Vincent was already employed. They remained together and at Indiana for the 
rest of their careers. Vincent died three weeks after Elinor’s own death from 
pancreatic cancer in 2012. 
 
In 1973, Vincent and Elinor founded their Workshop in Political Theory and Policy 
Analysis at the University of Indiana. This workshop focused especially on political 
and economic governance through polycentric systems, where, according to Vincent 
Ostrom, ‘polycentric connotes many centers of decision making that are formally 
independent of each other’ (V. Ostrom et al., 1961: 831). This initial analysis focused 
most upon questions of federal governance of public infrastructure such as water 
4 
 
projects in the USA. But within this work lay the foundations of later writings on 
institutions and the regulation of the commons. 
 
Like many political scientists of the era, the Ostroms had been influenced by the 
paper written in Science by Garrett Hardin (1968), The Tragedy of the Commons, 
which argued that unrestricted access to communal resources would inevitably lead to 
over-exploitation. Elinor and Vincent Ostrom were clearly concerned about this 
challenge in their own lives. In 2011, Elinor wrote a letter to the Sierra Club of 
Canada explaining how she and her husband had bought land on the southern shore of 
Manitoulin Island in Lake Huron in 1967, also building a log cabin. Over the years, 
they noted the decline in the levels of the lake, and how ‘investments in increased 
conveyance, dredging channels, and other public works have hardened the shoreline, 
led to losses of wetland habitats, and reduced fish habitat regions’ (Ostrom, 2011). 
Here were clear parallels between a concern for protecting communal natural 
resources and the public-policy challenge of regulating economic actors. 
 
Elinor and Vincent, however, began to develop an alternative vision to Hardin (1968) 
by showing how different means of access changed the nature of goods to be 
governed. For example, in 1977, the Ostroms developed an early categorization of 
economic goods based on the difficulty of excluding actors wishing to appropriate 
them. In this classification, private goods exist where private consumption reduces 
their availability for other consumers, but where it is possible to exclude other users. 
Common pool resources refer to goods that are decreased through consumption, but 
where exclusion is more difficult. Toll goods occur when consumption has minimal 
effect on the resource, and where it is easier to exclude consumers. And public goods 
are those that are reduced by consumption, but where exclusion is not possible 
(Ostrom and Ostrom, 1977). 
 
According to one later appreciation of their work, this early period demonstrated that 
Vincent and Elinor Ostrom were highly influenced by the major reorientation in 
social science in the USA after World War II along the lines of science during the 
1950s and 1960s, where the objective was to ‘usefully deploy and expand the 
economic way of thinking beyond its traditional boundaries while avoiding most of 
the criticisms of economic imperialism’ (Boettke and Coyne, 2005: 145). At its root, 
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this trend had a philosophical emphasis on methodological individualism — the 
analysis of social phenomena through seeing the motivations and actions of individual 
agents, following the influence of economic philosophers such as Frank Knight, 
Ludwig von Mises, and Friedrich Hayek.  
 
This early period also marked a further distinction of Elinor Ostrom’s career — of 
being an innovative female scholar when women’s opportunities within academia 
were limited. According to one later interview, ‘there was no encouragement to think 
about anything other than teaching in high school or being pregnant and barefoot in 
the kitchen’ (Zehr and Carson, 2009 in Ostrom, 2012: 26). She often remarked that 
she was hired partly because she was willing to teach a class on American 
government at the unpopular hour of 7:30 am (Woo, 2012). The department did not 
even have female bathrooms at the time, requiring women to use the men’s room and 
to put a sign on the door when they were inside (Solutions, 2010). 
 
 
Institutionalism and the Commons 
 
Elinor Ostrom’s work advanced and applied the rational choice model of political 
science in various ways. Her most significant legacy lay in applying methodological 
individualism to understand cooperative behavior and institutions. This work was 
used to advance Hardin’s (1968) thesis on the Tragedy of the Commons, and in 
theorizing pathways to collective action despite rational choice individualism. 
 
In 1982, Ostrom wrote, ‘we are coming to an end of an era in political science, a slow, 
whimpering end’ (Ostrom, 1982: 11). She was referring to the universal laws of 
positivism as a means of explanation within political science. Instead, Ostrom sought 
a middle ground where social responses to economic problems can be theorized as a 
result of rational behavior — but where ‘the cumulation we do achieve will be limited 
in scope to specific types of theoretically defined situations rather than sweeping 
theories of society as a whole’ (Ostrom, 1982: 26). These outcomes became part of 
Ostrom’s contribution to theories of institutions, or occasions of shared behavior 
within society. 
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Ostrom identified three different worlds of social behavior relating to action (where 
individuals act); collective choice (based on the decisions of representatives); and 
constitutional choices (which change how decisions or actions are taken). Institutions 
are defined as the shared decisions and behaviours that regulate otherwise rational, 
but egoistical, actions of individuals who seek to maximize their own benefits. She 
wrote: ‘if we limit the way we model individuals and situations to those models that 
have been successful in explaining market behavior, we may continually fail to show 
how different institutional arrangements help fallible and less than fully informed 
persons to achieve relatively satisfactory outcomes’ (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982: 218, 
emphasis in original). 
 
These principles were then applied to Ostrom’s most famous work on natural 
resources and the commons. Her 1990 book, Governing the Commons: The Evolution 
of Institutions for Collective Action (Ostrom, 1990) solidified research and debates 
that proposed ‘that neither the state nor the market is uniformly successful in enabling 
individuals to sustain long-term, productive use of natural resource systems’; and that 
‘communities of individuals have relied on institutions resembling neither the state 
nor the market to govern some resource systems with reasonable degrees of success 
over long periods of time’ (Ostrom, 1990: 1). This book took the well-known Tragedy 
of the Commons model of Garrett Hardin (1968), plus the existing analytical logics of 
collective action and the prisoner’s dilemma, to argue that institutions — or shared 
behaviour, and regulation of egoistical individualists — was not only possible, but 
empirically proven. 
 
This work also reflected broader changes in the analysis of institutions and political 
theory at the time. Governing the Commons was part of a highly influential series that 
was published by Cambridge University Press on the ‘Political Economy of 
Institutions and Decisions’. The series was co-edited by James Alt and Douglass 
North, whose work on the institutional foundations of economic and political life had 
at the time become highly influential in the American social sciences. At the heart of 
their framework was an assumption that institutions can be usefully defined as rules, 
norms and other ‘humanly devised constraints that structure political, social and 
economic interaction’ (North, 1991: 97). In the words of the editors, the focus of the 
series was ‘positive, rather than normative’, exploring the conditions under which 
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‘institutions evolve in response to individual incentives, strategies, and choices’, as 
well as the ways in which ‘institutions affect the performance of economic and 
political systems’ (Ostrom, 1990: xi).  
 
Ostrom’s particular focus on institutions and the commons also reflected an important 
constellation of publishers, researchers and scientific bodies, whose work was 
becoming increasingly interested in the institutional foundations of social and 
environmental change. In her preface to Governing the Commons, she writes that her 
‘awareness of the possibility of using detailed case studies written by other authors to 
obtain a sufficiently rich empirical base came about as a result of joining the National 
Academy of Sciences’ “Panel on Common Property Resource Management” in 1985,’ 
(Ostrom, 1990: xiv). According to Ostrom, all of the panelists were ‘asked to write 
their papers using a framework prepared by Ronald Oakerson’, whose 
conceptualization of institutions and resources emphasized ‘not only the physical 
properties of the resource systems but also what types of rules were used to regulate 
entry and use of these systems, what types of interactions resulted, and what types of 
outcomes were obtained’ (Ostrom, 1990: xiv).   
 
Governing the Commons was therefore part of a wider trend in American social 
science that emphasized the study of institutions (defined as rules), thereby eschewing 
the limitations of ‘value-laden’ theory and embracing a positivist social science rooted 
in formal modeling and empirical analysis. Yet, more important than the historical 
and professional factors affecting Ostrom’s decision to work in this particular 
paradigm was the influence of the new institutionalism on her conceptualization of 
collective action and the commons. Starting from the position that information (about 
the state of the resource and intentions of resource users) is costly, Ostrom argued that 
rules matter because they reduce the uncertainty that stems from the unpredictable 
behaviour of others and resource systems: 
In all cases in which individuals have organized themselves to solve CPR 
problems, rules have been established by the appropriators that have severely 
constrained the authorized actions available to them. Such rules specify, for 
example, how many resource units an individual can appropriate, when, 
where, and how they can be appropriated, and the amounts of labour, 
materials, or money that must be contributed to various provisioning activities. 
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If everyone, or almost everyone, follows these rules, resource units will be 
allocated more predictably and efficiently, conflict levels will be reduced, and 
the resource system itself will be maintained over time. (1990: 43; emphasis 
added) 
 
This approach to institutions also advanced the debate about the Tragedy of the 
Commons in several significant ways. First, she argued that Hardin’s earlier 
pessimism about individualistic exploitation of the commons referred only to open-
access resources or public goods that open to appropriation because of the lack of a 
sufficient governance or common-property regimes that transformed open-access 
resources into common-pool resources. Second, she therefore argued that Hardin’s 
stark choices between ecological collapse, state-led dictats, or privatization could be 
replaced by a more flexible, inclusive, and locally governed institutions for regulating 
excessive appropriation of resources. In addition to these important conceptual 
themes, Governing the Commons also presented field-work based research to 
demonstrate the nature and success of self-organizing institutions from diverse 
locations such as Switzerland, Japan, Spain, the Philippines and Turkey. 
 
Ostrom’s main point was that individuals will be more likely to create and conserve 
the commons when they have credible and reliable information about the costs and 
benefits of resource decisions and (crucially) when they have an opportunity to decide 
the rules of the game. Drawing upon her empirical case material, she identified eight 
‘design principles’ that would improve the effectiveness and sustainability of 
common property regimes: clear resource boundaries (i.e. knowing physical and 
ecological properties of the resource), clear rules of membership (knowing who is 
entitled to use the resource), congruence between rules of provision/appropriation and 
local conditions, arenas for ‘collective choice,’ mutual monitoring, ‘graduated’ 
sanctions, mechanisms for conflict resolution (i.e. ensuring that resource users are 
able to monitor and sanction other resource users) and, finally, a state that is willing to 
recognize (or at least not challenge) local rights of organization (Ostrom, 1990: 90).  
 
Grounded within a choice theoretic, the implication was that different property rights 
regimes (e.g. common, private, or a combination of the two) are the result of a 
selection process, in which ‘resource users’ craft institutions that best meet the needs 
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of resource users and the resource base. Whether resources fall prey to the Tragedy of 
the Commons is therefore not a foregone conclusion, as Hardin (1968) would lead us 
to believe, but rather an empirical outcome dependent on the existence of institutions 
governing access, utilization, management, exclusion, ownership and transfer of 
ownership.  
 
Furthermore, this form of analysis resonated with two further trends. First for many 
environmental analysts, the findings of Ostrom’s research offered the prospect of a 
solution to long-standing fears of Malthusian collapse or ecological ruin resulting 
from unregulated economic exploitation. Indeed, Ostrom (1990: 58) argued ‘the 
institutions discussed… have survived droughts, floods, wars, pestilence, and major 
economic and political change’. And secondly, in a period when individualistic 
economic thinking was popular, Ostrom offered a vision of cooperative behaviour 
that did not rely upon reverting to a centralized state. Indeed, for donors and NGOs, 
Ostrom’s design principles offered a model of decentralization and local resource 
governance that could be replicated in multiple field settings, and which used 
empowering local and incentive-based governance mechanisms.  
 
Ostrom’s work on the commons inspired further research projects and immense 
international interest in questions relating to the commons. Governing the Commons, 
and later books such as The Drama of the Commons (Dietz et al., 2002), expanded on 
common-property regime theory by exploring and empirically testing institutional 
design principles for self-organizing institutions. In fundamental terms, Ostrom and 
her colleagues argued that the three root conditions were: that the resource must be 
salient enough to encourage users to invest time to make rules; users must have 
autonomy to devise and change rules; and at least a subset of users must be able to 
engage in direct communication in order to bargain and negotiate (Stern et al., 2002: 
456). But these principles were also augmented by more operational factors such as 
clearly defined boundaries between resources and users; low cost of rule enforcement; 
monitoring resource use and rule compliance; reconciling conflicting values and 
interests; and so on (Ostrom, 1990: 182–92; Stern et al., 2002: 462–66). The 
identification and classification of institutional design principles has indeed become a 
debate of its own (Agrawal, 2008). These studies also sought to establish empirical 
evidence for success and failure, with most apparent success found at the small and 
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medium-scale enterprise such as involving monitoring of shared fisheries. Research 
has also questioned whether heterogeneity, or the size of groups of resource users can 
influence institutional success (Poteete and Ostrom, 2004). 
 
Ostrom was also the founder of the International Association for the Study of the 
Commons (IASC), a multi-disciplinary body ‘devoted to understanding and 
improving institutions for the management of resources that are (or could be) held or 
used collectively by communities in developing or developed countries’.1 The IASC’s 
Digital Library of the Commons and bi-annual conferences now provide an important 
forum for the discussion and dissemination of academic and applied research on a 
wide range of environmental and resource governance issues. According to the IASC 
website, the Digital Library of the Commons contains more than 60,000 citations and 
25,000 abstracts. It also supports a peer-reviewed journal, the International Journal of 
the Commons, and a compendium of training materials aimed at understanding and 
supporting local efforts to conserve the commons.  
 
That the IASC continues to attract the interest and support of a truly international 
network of scholars and practitioners speaks to Ostrom’s abilities as a leader, a 
fundraiser and a visionary. It also helps to illustrate the very healthy extent to which 
Ostrom and the IASC have fostered an open and academic dialogue about the terms 
on which researchers now study and interpret the commons. Indeed, some of the 
critical perspectives on which we draw below can be found on the Digital Library’s 
database.  
 
 
Challenges to Ostrom’s Work 
 
Elinor Ostrom’s approach to the study of institutions and institutional change was 
rooted in her application of rational choice theory and methodological individualism. 
At the heart of this model was an assumption that social outcomes can be explained in 
terms of the calculations that individuals make about the perceived costs and benefits 
of future actions. In her words (Ostrom, 1991: 243), the assumption is that 
                                                        
1
 http://www.iasc-commons.org 
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‘individuals compare expected benefits and costs of actions prior to adopting 
strategies for action’. By incorporating game theory and rational choice into policy 
analysis, her research also offered a systematic approach to the study and evaluation 
of public policy. She said, ‘our main goal has been to show… that the techniques of 
rules and games works and puts policy analysis on a sound logical footing’ (Ostrom et 
al., 1994: 96–97). 
 
But the approach also raised debates within development studies about the nature and 
origins of institutions, and the value of using rational choice theory to understand 
processes of environmental change. One persistent theme that has long featured in this 
debate is a methodological tension between the apparent reductionism of rational 
choice theory and the interpretivism of anthropological and historical research. For 
many critics, the focus on theory building and methodological individualism produced 
a body of research that was at times too far removed from the important aspects of 
context, culture and meaning that have bearing on the ways in which people use and 
manage common property regimes. In a critical volume on the commons, Prakash 
(1998: 168) for instance warned that the policy analyst’s ‘abstraction from the 
complexities of field settings’ may lead to ‘a reification of concepts, models and 
strategies’ (Prakash, 1998: 168). Similarly, and in more detail, the anthropologist 
David Mosse (1997: 486) argued that, 
. . . an institutional analysis of indigenous resources systems is unlikely to be 
useful unless it has first correctly characterized the social relations and 
categories of meaning and value in a particular resource system. In the first 
place this means resisting the tendency to impose a narrow definition of 
economic interest, utility and value . . . (Mosse, 1997: 472) 
 
And more critically, Michael Goldman (1998: 21) argued that Ostrom’s approach 
belied: 
 . . . a fundamental tension between knowledge production and historical 
consciousness, a tension between casting a blind eye towards the destructive 
forces of capitalist expansion onto the commons and a broad smile that beams 
at the ‘underskilled’ local commoner who defies all odds by protecting the 
commons. 
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Criticisms such as these illustrate the strong normative and ideological terms on 
which many scholars reacted to the work of Ostrom and rational choice scholars more 
generally. At the heart of these differences were well-documented tensions between 
different methodological styles, where, stereotypically, ‘economists are often in error, 
but seldom in doubt, whereas economists believe anthropologists spend too much 
time in the field without testable hypotheses’ (Bardhan and Ray, 2008b: 1) — or what 
Boettke and Coyne (2005: 152) somewhat dismissively call ‘compiling facts upon 
facts without a theoretical language to sort through them’. But the matters raised by 
this debate go beyond simply whether analysts should use contextual or nomothetic 
analysis. Rather, these themes question the appropriateness of Ostrom’s hypothetic-
deductive model of rational choice for the underlying problems she was trying to 
solve. 
 
First, concerning resources, various analysts have argued that common property 
regime analysis has tended to define resources and scarcity too essentially. Ostrom 
acknowledged that the physical characteristics of a resource are fundamental to the 
appropriateness of common property regimes. Two important factors are the 
stationarity of a resource (how resources are spatially confined prior to harvest), and 
storage (which refers to the ability of a resource to collect and hold resource units, 
such as in a reservoir) (Ostrom et al., 1994: 308). Accordingly, Ostrom herself has 
acknowledged that common property regimes work best in cases where the resources 
and resource users have clear boundaries, and where all actors agree on the rules of 
the game, such as in cases of reservoirs, or clearly defined pastureland where users 
have similar objectives. 
 
The risk of Ostrom’s new-institutionalist approach, therefore, is that resources, and 
the problems of resource scarcity, are identified in a priori terms, with the result that 
common property regime analysis misses the point of how resources and scarcity are 
meaningful to people. Mosse’s (1997) analysis of irrigation tanks in Tamil Nadu, for 
example, observed that tank users were not restricted to those who only saw tanks as 
repositories of water for irrigation, but that the main significance of these tanks as 
common pool resources lay in their multifarious social roles such as locations of 
social standing, caste, and cultural interaction. Accordingly the so-called self-
organized institutions for common property management were not developed entirely 
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to avoid the degradation or exhaustion of a scarce physical resource, but also to 
mediate social roles. 
 
A second and related concern is whether Ostrom’s analysis presupposes a cause and 
effect of ecological crisis that might be universal. Ostrom wrote, ‘human interventions 
cannot change fundamental physical regularities, such as the laws of physics and 
biology’ (Ostrom et al., 1994: 75). But one of the common features of Ostrom’s work 
is the implication that certain social outcomes such as violence, the Tragedy of the 
Commons, or other Malthusian scenarios would occur without the existence of 
institutions. For example, Ostrom gave one case study of illegal fishing and piracy off 
western Malaysia in the 1970s. She wrote: ‘unless the fishers themselves accept 
legislation as effective rules, however, they continue to play the fishing game as if the 
legislation did not exist. The possibility of violence is ever present’ (Ostrom et al., 
1994: 79–80). 
 
The underlying question here is whether phenomena such as the Tragedy, or violence, 
and other scenarios are as inevitable and uniform as this. It is worth remembering that 
Hardin’s (1968) original paper on the Tragedy was not an empirical analysis, but 
written more as a hypothetical parable that assumed human societies would act in 
certain ways. Other writers have argued that the Tragedy constitutes a classic 
‘development narrative’ that ‘tell scenarios not so much about what should happen as 
about what will happen according to their tellers — if the events or positions are 
carried out as described’ (Roe, 1991: 288). These arguments do not suggest that 
resource exhaustion does not occur, or should not be avoided. But instead they 
suggest that it is too simplistic to represent these problems as simply the inevitable 
result of rational human behaviour; or that failing to engage with so-called rational 
behavior will result in these projected outcomes. 
 
It also implies there are tensions in Ostrom’s attempts to marry an historical, 
inductive approach to case study material with her hypothetic-deductive model of 
rational choice because fieldwork and the selection of case studies are undertaken 
under an a priori framework determined through the Tragedy of the Commons. For 
example, Ostrom and her co-writers refer to various old anthropological analyses of 
land use as examples of responses to the Tragedy, when many of these studies 
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focused simply on local experiences and resource use in general, rather than being 
case studies of individualistic competition over resources as suggested by the Tragedy 
(e.g. Dietz et al., 2002: 13; Leach, 1954 in Ostrom, 1990: 239). Indeed, two critics 
suggested that ‘common property theory not only does not account for the 
ethnographic findings in… societies, but instead distorts data when applied to 
ethnographic cases’ (Lieber and Rynkiewich, 2007: 90).  
 
More generally, others have questioned whether searching for ‘success stories’ of 
institutions for collective action is itself flawed if it is based on a priori assumptions 
of what one is looking for. Indeed, de Sardan (2013: 287–88) questioned the very 
legitimacy of the fieldwork used in Governing the Commons because: 
New-institutional economists do, of course, carry out empirical analyses, but 
these are very much focused on the quantitative approach and remain 
essentially centered on what they consider to be the solid ground of firms and 
economic transactions . . . All in all, the typologies and conceptualizations 
advanced by new-institutional economics . . . are basically abstract and formal, 
deductive rather than inductive, in a sense just like the theoretical propositions 
of rational-choice economics. Their very generality consequently makes them 
immune to any attempt at empirical verification. 
 
Consequently, a third concern has been whether Ostrom’s approach to common 
property regime tended to adopt a ‘cookie-cutter’ style of prescribing both the nature 
of the problem and solution. This tendency to universalize institution building has 
been considered problematic because it diminishes the diversity in which localities 
can achieve institutional responses, but also the diversity by which resource scarcity is 
meaningful (Johnson, 2004). These criticisms are, of course, ironic given that 
Ostrom’s analysis has been considered by many to champion decentralization and 
local autonomy. Indeed, does Ostrom tend to conflate collective action with the 
formation of rules by states, development interventionists, or by discursive means, 
which might pre-shape how communities are expected to respond to problems? 
 
A related question here is whether, in order to analyse institutional responses to 
scarcity, Ostrom’s vision of common property regimes tended to assume common and 
uniform identities for individuals participating in rules. Agrawal (2005), for example, 
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argued that ‘environmental subjects’ (or participating individuals) can be shaped over 
time through careful government strategies such as engaging in forms of consultation, 
which can transform previously uncooperative exploiters to people willing to accept 
rules. Similarly, we, in another paper, have argued that ‘rights’-based approaches to 
development cannot assume that communities create rules autonomously without 
acknowledging how states (often in alliance with other actors) create the goalposts for 
what rights aim to achieve (Johnson and Forsyth, 2002). And more generally, Cleaver 
(2002) has proposed the term, ‘institutional bricolage’, to refer to a more malleable 
and contextually specific form of making institutions based on using pre-existing, and 
more legally pluralist rights and access. She commented:  
The evolution of collective decision-making institutions may not be the 
process of conscious selection of mechanisms fit for the collective action task 
as in Ostrom’s model but rather a messier process of piecing together shaped 
by individuals acting within the bounds of circumstantial constraint. (Cleaver, 
2002: 17) 
 
Ostrom responded to her various critics by engaging in debate about institutional and 
methodological diversity, and the crucial role of knowledge in informing and 
structuring responses (Poteete et al., 2010; Hess and Ostrom, 2007). She wrote: 
‘contextual variables are essential for understanding the initial growth and 
sustainability of collective action as well as the challenges that long-surviving self-
organized regimes must try to overcome. Simply saying that ‘context matters’ is not, 
however, a satisfactory theoretical approach’ (Ostrom, 2005: 287). Moreover, one of 
the key design principles for institutions is reconciling conflicting values and 
interests, and that ‘success means different things to different people’ (Stern et al., 
2002: 457). 
 
In a book published late in her career, Ostrom and her colleagues, Marco Janssen and 
Amy Poteete (Poteete et al., 2010) acknowledged the disagreements about large ‘n’ 
studies versus case studies, and aligned these as sources of evidence alongside meta-
analyis (such as synthesis), experiments and agent-based models as multi-faceted (and 
co-strengthening) sources of information about self-organizing institutions. In direct 
response to critics, they wrote: ‘We only wish that suspicion of nonethnographic 
research has not resulted in a misplaced attack on something called “common 
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property theory”’ (Poteete et al., 2010: 268). Optimistically (and perhaps opaquely?) 
they also noted, ‘promotion of methodological pluralism favors a theoretical 
eclecticism that should decrease concerns about existential threats to particular 
approaches, and should thus decrease the intensity of methodological debates’ 
(Poteete et al., 2010: 11). 
 
These statements, however, imply that Ostrom considered the challenges to her 
position to be epistemological — or referring to the means by which knowledge is 
generated. Instead, it seems clear that many criticisms of Ostrom’s approach to 
institutions are also ontological — in the sense of identifying which problem is being 
addressed. For Ostrom, her main objective was to demonstrate that rational responses 
to scarce resources need not result only in stark choices between ecological collapse 
(the Tragedy), state-led dictats, or individual (private) property rights alone. For other 
analysts, the objective is a more inclusive and meaningful form of governance that 
does not insist upon a predefined vision of the nature of the problem, and hence 
solution, which arises from an a priori belief in the Tragedy as an accurate and 
transferable summary of human behaviour. 
 
 
From Common Property Regimes to Multi-level Governance 
 
In later years, Elinor Ostrom also sought to apply her work on self-organizing 
institutions to wider spatial scales. Here, she drew on her earlier research and 
collaborations with her husband Vincent about the concept of polycentricism. The 
purpose of this work was to extend the logic of incentive-led and locally autonomous 
institutions towards policies that can be ‘scaled up’ to regions, national policies, or 
international frameworks. But these approaches did not imply universal institutions, 
or that polycentric systems were a panacea for problems.  
 
She wrote, ‘polycentric systems are characterized by multiple governing authorities at 
differing scales rather than a monocentric unit’ (Ostrom, 2010: 552). But different 
units within the system can make norms and rules within their own specific domain 
(ranging from families, firms, governments or networks). An important aspect of 
polycentric analysis is its ability to incorporate a wide variety of formal/informal and 
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state/non-state actors whose power to decide different resource governance outcomes 
varies in relation to different modes of governance (Ostrom, 2010). It also captures 
the important idea that different resources (e.g. land, water, air, etc.) have different 
governance dynamics, implying that resource attributes, social dynamics and 
institutional arrangements (defined as rules and norms) will have important bearing 
on resource sharing, conservation and distribution. Finally, the emphasis on networks 
and non-state actors highlights the role of leaders and ‘shadow networks’ in creating 
the conditions for collective action in polycentric resource governance regimes 
 
By so doing, polycentric systems can also become sites of learning and innovation, 
and where aspects of social capital and cooperation can be enhanced. Ostrom’s work 
therefore began to contribute more directly to international regime formation 
(Keohane and Ostrom, 1995), the role of knowledge and epistemic communities 
within environmental policy (Hess and Ostrom, 2007), and the integration of diverse 
actors and institutions within systems (Ostrom, 2007b; Ostrom, 2007a). Indeed, 
Ostrom applied this framework to global climate change policy. She wrote: ‘Climate 
change is a global collective-action problem… while many of the effects of climate 
change are global, the causes of climate change are the actions taken by actors at 
smaller scales’ (Ostrom, 2010: 550–51). 
 
Yet, Ostrom’s writings about climate change also indicated the same controversies 
relating to her earlier work. In a paper written for the World Bank, Ostrom (2009:1) 
used the term ‘adaptive governance’ to refer to ‘the potential for building a more 
effective way of reducing greenhouse gas emissions at multiple levels’. In this sense, 
Ostrom was re-using her rational-choice framework in order to identify how to 
change (or adapt) individualistic consumption of greenhouse gases in order to reduce 
degradation of communal resources (the atmosphere). But at the same time, this 
approach frames climate change policy in terms of regulating individual contributions 
to atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations. Various other scholars, however, have 
argued that this framework avoids questions of equitable distributions of emissions, or 
the extent to which atmospheric changes are indeed experienced communally. For 
example, many developing-world analysts have argued that greenhouse gas emissions 
should not be regulated according to current consumption, but should also 
acknowledge historic emissions, and the purposes for which emissions are made. 
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Indeed, some emissions might allow poorer countries to become less vulnerable to 
climate change (Agarwal and Narain, 1991). 
 
Similarly, other scholars have questioned how far increasing greenhouse gas 
concentrations pose a shared and communal risk because the impacts of climate 
change are also influenced by variations in social vulnerability. Hence, Ostrom’s 
emphasis on ‘adaptive governance’ seeks to build communal benefits by achieving 
climate change mitigation among multiple actors at different spatial scales. But this 
emphasis stands in contrast to ‘adaptation’ to climate change, which instead focuses 
on the means of reducing vulnerability, and where it is acknowledged that ‘climate 
change is a global risk, yet vulnerability is locally experienced’ (Ayers, 2011: 62).  
Consequently, it is difficult to identify common risks posed by climate change 
without acknowledging social vulnerability — and efforts to mitigate climate change 
without acknowledging the need for adaptation might overlook the local and 
contextual factors that make climate change a risk. 
 
Ostrom’s work on global environmental governance formed part of a larger paradigm 
since the mid-1990s of using market-based instruments to regulate carbon use. At face 
value, there seem many similarities between Ostrom’s framework of rational choice 
and polycentricism and the current adoption of carbon trading schemes such as 
Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) or the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme. These policy schemes resemble 
Ostrom’s frameworks because they involve clearly defined boundaries about 
resources and procedures; and with a multi-tier structure that can include citizens, 
companies, industries, nation states, and blocs of nation states. Yet, Ostrom’s specific 
writings on climate change were relatively few (Ostrom, 2009, 2010; Solutions, 
2010), and analyses of the genealogy of carbon markets have cited economists and 
theorists of cap-and-trade rather than political scientists or institutionalists such as 
Ostrom (Calel, 2013). 
 
Perhaps this distance between Ostrom’s new institutionalism and economic models of 
climate change policies reflects the somewhat muted response of some economists to 
Ostrom winning the 2009 Nobel Prize for Economics. The economist Steven Levitt of 
the University of Chicago commented: 
19 
 
If you had done a poll of academic economists yesterday and asked who 
Elinor Ostrom was, or what she worked on, I doubt that more than one in five 
economists could have given you an answer. I personally would have failed 
the test. I had to look her up on Wikipedia, and even after reading the entry, I 
have no recollection of ever seeing or hearing her name mentioned by an 
economist. She is a political scientist, both by training and her career (in Izzo, 
2009). 
 
Similarly, Paul Krugman of Princeton University, and himself the 2008 Nobel Prize 
winner, said:  
The way to think about this prize is that it’s an award for institutional 
economics, or maybe more specifically New Institutional Economics… I 
wasn’t familiar with Ostrom’s work, but even a quick scan shows why she 
shared the prize: if the goal is to understand the creation of economic 
institutions, it’s crucial to be aware that there is more variety in institutions, a 
wider range of strategies that work, than simply the binary divide between 
individuals and firms (in Izzo, 2009). 
 
Quotations such as these — made in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis — suggest 
that Ostrom’s work has had problems being accepted by economists, as well as 
causing debate within non-rational choice approaches to development studies. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Elinor Ostrom contributed significantly to development studies by arguing that 
individuals — well informed and with minimum rights of autonomy and monitoring 
— could undertake collective action to protect communal resources without causing 
irreparable degradation, or requiring the intervention of the state or private property 
rights. Ostrom’s work offered a more optimistic and focused approach to 
development interventions than previous discussions about the Tragedy of the 
Commons, and it identified roles for interventionists and citizens to undertake action. 
Ostrom also applied this insight to thinking about development aid and public 
governance in general (Gibson et al., 2005; Ostrom 1991, 2007a). 
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In this sense, Ostrom’s work provided both a criticism, and a reflection, of trends in 
political science and development studies since the 1980s. Her work challenged many 
extreme neo-liberal concerns by emphasizing cooperative behavior and the possibility 
for solutions not involving private property. Yet, fairly or unfairly, her work was also 
associated with the intellectual and ideological environment of the 1980s and 1990s 
because of her emphasis on rational choice and methodological individualism, and 
because her proposed solutions to resource scarcity implied bypassing the state. 
 
The criticisms of Ostrom’s research approach can be those applied to rational choice 
decision making and methodological individualism in general. There is little doubt 
that building institutions to regulate exploitative behaviour or to empower localized 
policy making are welcome steps, especially in the context of environmental 
degradation. But critics argue that the analysis of self-organizing institutions for 
collective action typified by Ostrom too frequently predefine the problem that 
institutions were seeking to resolve, or put too much faith into a specific type of 
political bargaining processes to achieve outcomes. The problem caused by these 
generalizations is that they reduce the objectives of what institutions are for, and 
hence avoid important local variations and meanings. For example, common property 
regimes provide incentives and rules to encourage actors at various spatial scales to 
regulate individualistic resource exploitation. There is little space here for more 
diverse understandings of what resource exploitation is for, or for alternative 
conceptions of rationality. Instead, critics have urged more attention to the continuing 
role of the state or other actors in influencing the nature and objectives of institutions 
— or of the excluding impact of Ostrom’s own approach on how development 
problems and solutions are defined. 
 
Some analysts have argued that Ostrom’s work cannot be criticized for ‘economic 
imperialism’ (Boettke and Coyne, 2005: 145). But it is also clear that the hypothetic-
deductive model of rational choice as a response to an assumed shared problem of a 
Tragedy of the Commons carries some assumptions about how different people and 
societies address environmental scarcity. Indeed, many analysts have argued that 
these assumptions get in the way of building effective and meaningful environmental 
policy. 
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Looking forward, it appears that development studies is now witnessing a gradual 
transition from such a hypothetic-deductive, but overly nomothetic, model of 
explanation towards more deliberative and diverse approaches to global policy. As 
Ostrom noted in 1982, linear positivism is ‘coming to... a slow, whimpering end’ 
(Ostrom, 1982: 11). But moving on from positivistic generalizations entails not just 
explaining and demonstrating institutional and collective action in-between the state 
and market, but also rethinking the universality of how problems and policy 
objectives are identified and addressed (Sen, 2009). A movement to institutions needs 
to be matched by a more deliberative and participatory approach to defining problems 
and potential political processes. 
 
In retrospect, Elinor Ostrom will be remembered for the seminal contribution she 
made to the study of institutions, rational choice theory and her applied work on 
environmental policy and governance. Through her work with the IASC and with 
other networks of scholars and practitioners, she clearly influenced the ways in which 
donors, NGOs and development practitioners now understand and address 
environmental problems, providing the empirical and theoretical basis for moving 
beyond the unhelpful dichotomy between market and state. She also provided a 
powerful argument in favour of working and experimenting with local solutions and 
human ingenuity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Agarwal, A. and S. Narain (1991) Global Warming in an Unequal World. New Delhi: 
Centre for Science and Environment. 
Agrawal, A. (2005) Environmentality: Technologies of Government and the Making 
of Environmental Subjects. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Agrawal, A. (2008) ‘Sustainable Governance of Common-pool Resources: Context, 
Method, and Politics’, in P. Bardhan and I. Ray (eds) The Contested 
Commons: Conversations Between Economists and Anthropologists, pp. 46–
65. Oxford, Blackwell. 
Ayers, J. (2011) ‘Resolving the Adaptation Paradox: Exploring the Potential for 
Deliberative Adaptation Policy-making in Bangladesh’, Global Environmental 
Politics 11(1): 62–88. 
Bardhan, P. and I. Ray (2008a) The Contested Commons:Conversations between 
Economists and Anthropologists. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Bardhan, P. and I. Ray (2008b) ‘Economists, Anthropologists, and the Contested 
Commons’, in P. Bardhan and I. Ray (eds) The Contested Commons: 
Conversations between Economists and Anthropologists, pp. 1–24. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Boettke, P.J. and C.J. Coyne (2005) ‘Methodological Individualism, Spontaneous 
Order and the Research Program of the Workshop in Political Theory and 
Policy Analysis’, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 57(2): 145–
58. 
Calel, R. (2013) ‘Carbon Markets: A Historical Overview’, Wiley Interdisciplinary 
Reviews: Climate Change 4:107–19. 
Cleaver, F. (2002) ‘Reinventing Institutions: Bricolage and the Social Embeddedness 
of Natural Resource Management’, The European Journal of Development 
Research 14(2): 11–30. 
de Sardan, J–P. (2013) ‘Embeddedness and Informal Norms: Institutionalisms and 
Anthropology’, Critique of Anthropology 33: 288–99. 
Dietz, T., N. Dolsak, E. Ostrom and P.C. Stern (2002) ‘The Drama of the Commons’, 
in T. Dietz, N. Dolsak, E. Ostrom, P.C. Stern, S.C. Stonich and E.U. Weber 
23 
 
(eds) The Drama of the Commons, pp. 3–35. Washington DC: National 
Academy Press. 
Gibson, C.C., K. Andersson, E. Ostrom and S. Shivakumar (2005) The Samaritan's 
Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Ai. Oxford/New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Goldman, M. (1998) ‘Inventing the Commons: Theories and Practices of the 
Commons’ Professional,’ in Goldman (ed.) Privatizing Nature: Political 
Struggles for the Global Commons, pp. 20–53. New Jersey: Rutgers 
University Press. 
Hardin, G. (1968) ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, Science 1243–48. 
Hess, C. and E. Ostrom (2007) Understanding Knowledge as A Commons: From 
Theory to Practic. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Izzo, P. (2009) ‘Economists React: Nobel Award Sends Message about Economics’, 
Wall Street Journal, 12 October 2009. 
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2009/10/12/economists–react–nobel–award–
sends–message–about–economics/  (accessed December 2013). 
Johnson, C. (2004) ‘Uncommon Ground: the ‘Poverty of History’ in Common 
Property Discourse’, Development and Change 35(3): 407–33. 
Johnson, C. and T. Forsyth (2002) ‘In the Eyes of the State: Negotiating a “Rights–
based Approach” to Forest Conservation in Thailand’, World Development 
30(9): 1591–605. 
Keohane, R.O. and E. Ostrom (1995) Local Commons and Global Interdependence : 
Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Two Domains. London: Thousand Oaks. 
Kiser, L.L. and E. Ostrom (1982) ‘The Three Worlds of Action: A Metatheoretical 
Synthesis of Institutional Approaches’, in E. Ostrom (ed.) Strategies of 
Political Inquiry, pp. 179–222. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
Leach, E. (1954) Political Systems of Highland Burma: A study of Kachin Social 
Structure. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Lieber, M.D. and M. Rynkiewich (2007) ‘Conclusion: Oceanic Conceptions of the 
Relationship Between People and Property’, Human Organization 66(1): 90–
96. 
Mosse, D. (1997) ‘The Symbolic Making of a Common Property Resource: History, 
Ecology and Locality in a Tank Irrigated Landscape in South India’, 
Development and Change 28(3): 467–504. 
24 
 
North, D.C. (1991) ‘Institutions’, The Journal of Economic Perspectives 5(1): 97–
112. 
Ostrom, E. (1982) ‘Beyond Positivism: An Introduction to this Volume’, in E. Ostrom 
(ed.) Strategies of Politicail Inquiry, pp. 11–28. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
Ostrom, E. (1990) Governing theCcommons: The Evolution of Institutions for 
CollectiveAaction. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Ostrom, E. (1991) ‘Rational Choice Theory and Institutional Analysis: Toward 
Complementarity’, American Political Science Review 85(1): 237–43. 
Ostrom, E. (2005) Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Ostrom, E. (2007a) ‘A Diagnostic Approach for Going Beyond Panaceas’, Proc Natl 
Acad Sci U S A 104(39): 15181–87. 
Ostrom, E. (2007b) ‘Multiple Institutions for Multiple Outcomes’, in A. Smajgl and 
S. Larson (eds) Sustainable Resource Use: Institutional Dynamics and 
Economics, pp. 23–50. London, Earthscan. 
Ostrom, E. (2009) ‘A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate change’. World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5095. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Ostrom, E. (2010) ‘Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and 
Global Environmental Change’, Global Environmental Change 20(4): 550–
57. 
Ostrom, E. (2011) Letter to the Sierra Club of Canada, 28 July. 
http://www.sierraclub.ca/sites/sierraclub.ca/files/prof_ostrom_letter.pdf  
(accessed December 2013). 
Ostrom, E. (2012) ‘Creating a Space where Gender Matters: Elinor Ostrom (1933–
2012) talks with Ann Mari May and Gale Summerfield’, Feminist Economics 
18(4) 25–37. 
Ostrom, E., R. Gardner, J. Walker and A. Agrawal (1994) Rules, Games, and 
Common–pool Resources. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 
Ostrom, E. and V. Ostrom (1977) ‘Public Goods and Public Choices’, in E. Savas 
(ed.) Alternatives for Delivering Public Services: Towards Improved 
Performance, pp. 7–49. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Ostrom, E., L.D. Schroeder and S.G. Wynne (1993) Institutional Incentives and 
Sustainable Development: Infrastructure Policies in Perspective. Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press. 
25 
 
Ostrom, V., C.M. Tiebout and R. Warren (1961) ‘The Organization of Government in 
Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry’, American Political Science 
Review 55: 831–42. 
Poteete, A.R., M. Janssen and E. Ostrom (2010) Working Together: Collective Action, 
the Commons, and Multiple Methods in Practice. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Poteete, A.R. and E. Ostrom (2004) ‘Heterogeneity, Group Size and Collective 
Action: The Role of Institutions in Rorest Management’, Development and 
Change 35(3): 435–62. 
Prakash, S. (1998) ‘Fairness, Social Capital and the Commons: The Societal 
Foundations of Collective Action in the Himalaya’, in Goldman (ed.), 
Privatizing Nature: Political Struggles for the Global Commons, pp.167–97. 
New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. 
Roe, E.M. (1991) ‘Development Narratives, or Making the Best of Blueprint 
Development’, World Development 19(4): 287–300. 
Sen, A. (2009) The Idea of Justice. London: Allen Lane. 
Solutions (2010) ‘Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom on Why Climate Change Solutions 
Work Best when they’re Local,’ 
http://www.thesolutionsjournal.com/node/583  (acccessed December 2013). 
Stern, P. C., T. Dietz, N. Dolsak, E. Ostrom and S.C. Stonich (2002) ‘Knowledge and 
Questions after 15 Years of Research’, in T. Dietz, N. Dolsak, E. Ostrom, P.C. 
Stern, S.C. Stonich and E.U. Weber (eds) The Drama of the Commons, pp. 
445–90. Washington DC: National Academy Press. 
Woo, E. (2012) ‘Elinor Ostrom Dies at 78; First Woman to Win Nobel in 
Economics’, The Los Angeles Times June 13, 2012. 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/13/local/la–me–elinor–ostrom–20120613 
(accessed December 2013). 
Zehr, B. and B. Carson (2009) ‘Ostrom Becomes First Woman to Win Nobel Prize in 
Economics’, Indiana Daily Student, October 13. 
 
Tim Forsyth  
26 
 
Department of International Development, London School of Economics and Political 
Science, London WC2A 2AE. t.j.forsyth@lse.ac.uk 
 
Craig Johnson 
Department of Political Science, University of Guelph, Ontario, N1G 2W1, 
cjohns06@uoguelph.ca 
 
 
